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From a staunch opponent to a reluctant supporter and now an active participant, 
China has dramatically transformed its perceptions and behavior in UN peace-
keeping during the past three decades. China’s shifting attitudes have attracted 
increasing academic attention. However, little quantitative study has been con-
ducted to systematically explore China’s motivations and selection criteria for 
participation in UN peacekeeping. It is therefore difficult to make generalizable 
claims. This essay focuses on China’s participation from 1989 to 2010 and em-
ploys both logistic and linear regression models to examine the roles of China’s 
economic, territorial, reputational interests and security policy in China’s deci-
sion-making around peacekeeping. The statistical results show that the change in 
the PLA’s operational orientation positively influences China’s participation and 
China appears primarily to be a self-interested actor as to peacekeeping. 
*Zhou Hang is a research assistant in the China and Global Security Project, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This is an abridged ver-
sion of the author’s Master thesis, completed as part of his master’s degree in 
peace and conflict studies at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Upp-
sala University, Sweden  
32 
Issue 3 
September 2013 AFRICAN 
EAST-ASIAN 
AFFAIRS 
© Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University 
All Rights Reserved. 
http://aeaa.journals.ac.za  
Introduction 
From not participating in the voting on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation 
(UNPKO) to supporting the majority of resolutions on it; from not paying any peace-
keeping related dues to being the 7th financial provider (UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, 2012), China has dramatically shifted its attitudes on UNPKO in 
the past three decades. The UNPKO constitutes a new platform where the interaction 
between China and other international actors (the UN, host countries and other troop 
contributors) unfolds. In fact, China is currently the top troop contributor among the 
P-5 members.  
China’s increasing contribution could not come in a more timely fashion. The post-
Cold War period has witnessed a worldwide surge of UNPKO deployment, mainly 
due to the re-ignition of civil wars which the US-Soviet rivalry used to keep a lid on. 
Both peacekeeping and conflict are becoming more complex. Nevertheless, while the 
UN peacekeeping regime is facing unprecedented challenges in terms of material, 
human and financial resources, the West remains ambivalent and distant at a moment 
when UNPKO is in urgent need of support and largely embodies a Western interpre-
tation of peace, that is to say – peace operations become more about contributing to 
the construction of democratic polities, liberal economies and societies (Bellamy & 
Williams, 2009: 44). This vacuum is gradually filled by the emerging countries, of 
which China is representative. In fact, UN Security-Generals Kofi Annan and Ban Ki
-moon have both encouraged China to boost its contribution to peacekeeping 
(Ransom, 2008; UN Radio, 2004). 
China’s about-face from its originally recalcitrant position vìs-a-vìs UNPKO has 
attracted increasing attention from academia. While research on China’s participa-
tion in UNPKO is growing, the bulk of literature concentrates itself methodological-
ly on qualitative single-case studies, in which different, or sometimes conflicting 
arguments have been put forward to decrypt China’s motivation. Through either fo-
cusing on China’s role in one specific UNPKO (e.g. Hirono, 2011; Lanteigne, 2011) 
or mainly providing a historical overview of China’s changing attitudes (e.g. He, 
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2007; Wang & Zuo, 2010), comparative case studies are also very limited. 
These methodological limitations are especially noticeable in literature pub-
lished in Chinese, most of which is non-theoretical and essentially policy-
oriented (e.g. Guo, 2008; Wang & Zuo, 2010; Zhang 2004). Without the support 
of statistical evidence, a number of explanations advanced by analysts to eluci-
date China’s motivation could risk being drawn from the study of outliner cases; 
and therefore cannot be generalized. This paper aims at filling this methodologi-
cal gap and unveiling Beijing’s selection criteria for participating in UNPKO by 
conducting a quantitative study on the research question: why China sends its 
peacekeepers to some UNPKOs instead of others? 
Based on Wallensteen’s (2011) four models of major power politics – Kapital-
politik, Geopolitik, Idealpolitik and Realpolitik, previous research on China’s 
motivation for participation can be classified into four different analytical an-
gles. Research based on the Kapitalpolitik and Idealpolitik models respectively 
claims that China’s economic and reputational interests propel it to adopt a far 
more active stand on UN peacekeeping. Argument predicated on the Geopolitik 
model, on the other hand, asserts that China’s participation is likely to be con-
strained by its concern over the implications of being involved in peacekeeping 
in territorial conflict, because of China’s oft-challenged territorial claims over its 
own border areas and its unwillingness to set a precedent for international inter-
vention in its own territory. Lastly, research based on the Realpolitik model 
takes an institution-based approach to concentrate on the role of the army in 
determining state participation in peacekeeping. It argues that a country is more 
likely to send peacekeepers - and probably a larger number - when its security 
policy is more externally-oriented. 
Ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic regressions are used to test the hypoth-
eses against samples that cover the UNPKOs between 1989 and 20101. The 
problem of influential data seems to plague the statistical test and makes it diffi-
cult to draw conclusive statements. Tentative solutions of removing influential 
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data have been advanced to obtain reliable statistical results. The most significant 
result is concerned with the effect of China’s security policy on its participation in 
peacekeeping. China was more likely to participate and send more peacekeepers 
after the introduction of an increasingly externally-oriented security policy intro-
duced in 2005. The roles of economic and territorial interests are both pointed to by 
evidence from the statistical test, which suggests that China’s decision on peacekeep-
ing appears to be guided by self-interest. Besides, the number of battle-related deaths 
seems to be the worst predictor. It exerts no influence on whether or not China par-
ticipates and how much contribution it makes. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: the next session briefly presents the devel-
opment of four hypotheses on China’s motivation based on previous research. Fol-
lowing this is a short discussion of the research design which is then followed by the 
presentation of statistical results and the discussion of their implications. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the findings and some general policy implications that 
can be derived from the findings. 
Development of hypotheses 
This paper resorts to Wallensteen’s four models of major power politics as a refer-
ence framework to categorize previous research on China’s motivation for participa-
tion. Each model represents one area of interaction between major powers, from 
which change and potential conflict thereof may stem. Geopolitik and Realpolitik are 
rather self-explanatory – the former concerned with the politics of territory and the 
latter about the control of military power. Kapitalpolitik is devoted to the question of 
international trade and commerce, and Idealpolitik is related to the legitimacy of the 
state. Although these models were not initially formulated to analyze China’s UN 
peacekeeping, they largely reflect the different perspectives of the majority of previ-
ous research on China’s peacekeeping policy.  
The majority of research in English on China’s motives for participation is essential-
ly realist and economic-centric. Various authors (Hellström 2009; Hirono & Lan-
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teigne 2011; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2008; Wu & Talyor 2011; Zhao 2011) 
argue that China is in pursuit of economic interests through UN peacekeeping. 
UN peacekeeping is believed to help secure a favorable external environment 
for China’s sustainable economic development – more specifically, in promoting 
trade, such as the export of goods and import of raw materials, with host coun-
tries. This argument leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The probability that China sends its peacekeepers (China’s con-
tribution to UNPKO is higher/larger) if the trade volume between China and 
host countries is higher.  
Beijing’s support to UNPKO is bound by its flexibility on sovereignty and inter-
vention. China’s historical experience of being “semi-colonized” laid the foun-
dation for China’s rigid interpretation of sovereignty and the establishment of 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – including non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty 
– on which China’s foreign policy is still in principle predicated (Carlson, 2005; 
He, 2007; Hirono & Lanteigne, 2011; ICG, 2009; Taylor, 2008b: 136; Wu & 
Taylor, 2008). China’s oft-challenged territorial claims over the border areas 
obliges it to adhere to a traditional interpretation of sovereignty in case any com-
promise on the issue of sovereignty and intervention may backfire (Carlson 
2005; Chen 2009: 158; Choedon, 2005: 54; Gill & Reilly, 2000; He, 2007, Wu 
& Taylor, 2011: 138). Many researchers (Carlson, 2005; Chen, 2009; Huang, 
2011; Staehle, 2008) observe a softening of China’s attitudes towards interven-
tion and a process of China’s gradual socialization into the UN peacekeeping 
regime in recent years; however, safeguarding territorial integrity still consti-
tutes one of China’s core interests and priorities; China is concerned that its con-
sent to intrusive missions would have implications for its own territorial inter-
ests. The second hypothesis is therefore drawn as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: The probability that China sends its peacekeepers/China’s contri-
bution to UNPKO is lower/smaller if a mission is established to keep peace in 
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territorial conflict. 
With its political and economic role emerging on the global stage, China also draws 
increasing scrutiny, which makes it realize the importance of projecting a benign and 
positive image. This line of argument can also be considered interest-based, whereas 
it differs from the previous explanations in the way that it highlights China’s idea-
tional gains instead of material ones. Extensive literature both in English (Carlson, 
2004: 11; He, 2007: 48-50; Hellström, 2009: 35-39; ICG, 2009: 12-14; Pang, 2005: 
96; Taylor, 2008: 152; Thompson, 2005; Wu & Taylor, 2011: 142; Zhao, 2011: 345) 
and in Chinese (Tang, 2002; Wang & Zuo, 2010: 49-50; Zhang, 2004: 49; Zhang, 
2009: 27; Zhao, 2009: 66; Zhong & Wang, 2006: 36; Zhou & Zhang, 2007: 59) 
claim that China’s campaign in portraying itself as a responsible, cooperative and 
benign global power stimulates its recent enthusiasm on UNPKO. Ideally and argua-
bly, contributing to peacekeeping in conflict that is more severe in terms of human 
suffering constitutes the best testimony to China’s determination of being a 
“responsible global power” and it may also assist in boosting China’s reputation on a 
larger scale. In addition, Chinese analysts, such as Zhang (2004: 47), criticize the 
West for turning a blind eye to conflict areas where peace is difficult to keep and 
where there is less strategic value but more risk. He highlights the humanitarian and 
idealist rationales behind China’s decision. It implies that China’s stance on peace-
keeping is primarily guided by humanitarian concerns. Consequently, the third hy-
pothesis is advanced.  
Hypothesis 3: The probability that China sends its peacekeepers/China’s contribu-
tion to UNPKO is higher/larger if the conflict concerned is more severe in terms of 
human suffering. 
All the aforthmentioned hypotheses are drawn from the analytical perspective that 
considers China as a unitary actor. Velázquez’s study (2010), disaggregating the 
unitary state into component institutions, concentrates on how the military and for-
eign policy circles influence a state’s decision on peacekeeping and concludes that a 
country with an externally-oriented army is more likely to send peacekeeping troops 
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into he field. An externally-oriented army, instead of shouldering major respon-
sibility in maintaining public order and carrying out enforcement functions in 
the domestic setting – as the army with prevailing national security doctrines 
does – is likely to appeal to UNPKO, because UNPKO is in accordance with its 
doctrinal principle. Additionally, it will be especially sympathetic to UNPKO 
when there is no major external threat, as peacekeeping operations offer oppor-
tunity to garner field operation experiences in the absence of war (Velázquez, 
2010).  It is observed that the PLA’s security doctrine has been evolving towards 
a more external orientation since the introduction of President Hu’s new concept 
of “new historic missions” at the end of 2004 (Gill & Huang, 2009: 15; Hirono 
& Lanteigne, 2011: 250; Mulvenon, 2009). Hu’s concept represents a natural 
outcome of, and response to, the challenges originating from China’s ever-
deepening engagements and entanglements with the world. It also invests the 
PLA with a new broadened “operational orientation” that ranges “from defense 
of sea lines of communication for energy security to international peacekeeping 
operations” (Mulvenon, 2009: 9). The last hypothesis therefore is: 
Hypothesis 4: The probability that China’s contribution is higher/larger after 
2005 compared to previous years.  
Research design 
The hypotheses are tested against the UNPKO missions between 1989 and 2010, 
regardless of whether the mission started or terminated within that period. The 
time frame is selected because China joined the UN Special Peacekeeping Com-
mittee in 1988. In the following year, China sent twenty civilian observers to the 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia for the first 
time. The dependent variable is measured in three different ways and therefore 
different regression models are employed accordingly. The logistic regression 
model is used when China’s participation is measured by the dichotomous varia-
ble participation (parti) and the OLS regression model is employed when Chi-
na’s participation is gauged by the continuous variable contribution (ctb). The 
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dichotomous dependent variable Parti is coded as “1” indicating China’s participa-
tion, and “0” otherwise2. Two continuous variables measuring China’s contribution 
annually are employed, respectively Contribution in number (Ctb-num) and Contri-
bution in percentage (Ctb-perc). Since the number of Chinese peacekeepers in a UN-
PKO varies month by month within one year, the peak month is selected for the vari-
able Ctb-num. For the variable Ctb-perc, it is calculated by dividing the number of 
Chinese peacekeepers by the total UN peacekeepers from all the countries3.  
Four independent variables are created. The variable Trade in million US dollars is 
used to measure the trade relationship between China and host countries. In the lo-
gistic regression, the variable is measured as the average trade volume between Chi-
na and host countries in the three-year periods prior to the beginning of UNPKO or 
China’s participation. In the linear regressions, the variable is measured as the annual 
trade volume between China and host countries one year preceding the annual obser-
vations for each UNPKO4. The variable Terricon is coded “1” if the incompatibility 
of conflict is concerned with territorial issues and coded “0” otherwise. I rely on the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011 (Gleditsch et al., 2002), which makes 
a distinction between “incompatibility concerning government” and 
“incompatibility concerning territory” to code this variable. The severity of a con-
flict is measured by the number of battle-related deaths. The variable Bdeath is 
measured as the aggregate battle-related death one year prior to the start of UNPKO 
or of China’s participation in the logistic regression; and it is measured as the aggre-
gate battle-related death one year preceding the annual observations of each UNPKO 
in the linear regression. Two sources are relied on – the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset 
Version 3.0 (Lacina and Gledtisch, 2005), and the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Da-
taset v.5-2011. The last independent variable is Secupo. President Hu assigned “new 
historic missions” to the PLA in the end of 2004. Hence, to measure the effect of the 
security doctrine, in the logistic regression, all the missions that had not ended by the 
end of 2004 or were initiated after December 31, 2004 are coded “1” and coded “0” 
otherwise. In the linear regressions, all the post-2005 annual observations of UN-
PKO are coded as “1” and “0” otherwise. To control any geographical differences, 
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four dummy variables for the following regions are included: Asia/Pacific, Eu-
rope/Former Soviet Union; Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Africa. The Western 
Hemisphere is the baseline category.  
Empirics and analysis 
Statistical results  
(Table 1 on next page) 
Findings for the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 – Economic interests 
The statistical results in Table 1 provide no evidence to the first hypothesis, but 
this is probably due to the problem of small sample size and influential data. 
With some influential data removed, there is stronger evidence supporting the 
hypothesis. 
The Trade variable generates only one significant coefficient out of the four 
regressions. Even more surprisingly, contrary to the theoretical expectation, 
three regressions indicate a negative relationship between bilateral trade and 
China’s interests in UNPKO. One of the regressions from the linear regression 
with Ctb-perc as dependent variable is -5,078E-05, significant at the 90% level.  
Careful investigation is needed to interpret this counter-theoretical finding, giv-
en that it contradicts the conclusions of previous statistical research (Lawson, 
2011; Lin-Greenberg, 2009), in which economic interest is identified as a moti-
vating factor for China. To begin with, the size of samples for the logistic re-
gressions, in which n are around 50, is limited. This dearth of data may cause 
difficulty in producing significant coefficients. Meanwhile, theoretically, the 
transformation of China’s security policy into being more externally-oriented 
can be ascribed to the increasing interdependency between China’s economy 
and the external world; therefore, a correlation between the Trade and Secupo 
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Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% * (Sig values are in parentheses; coeffi-
cients that are significant at least at the 90 % significance level are in bold) 
Table 1. Determinants of China's participation in UNPKO,  
Logistic and linear regressions 
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variable may exist and potentially gives rise to multicollinearity and renders the 
Trade coefficient insignificant.  
However, when the Secupo variable was dropped from all the regressions, the 
Trade coefficients did not gain significance and the co-linearity diagnostics 
showed acceptable Tolerance values, which ruled out the possibility of multi co-
linearity6. Lastly, “the method of least-squares is very sensitive to the structure 
of the data and can be markedly influenced by one or a few unusual observa-
tions” (Fox, 2012). As the dependent variables Ctb-perc and Ctb-num both 
measure China’s contribution to UNPKO annually, peacekeeping operations that 
last for a long period are likely to have over-proportional influence upon the 
statistical model. A look at the partial regression plots of both linear models 
reveals problems of potential influential data7. In both equations, the culprits 
appear to be some observations drawn from the United Nations Military Observ-
er Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). China has not participated in this 
mission and the annual observations of this mission from 2005 to 2010 are cod-
ed with an enormous amount of trade volume between China, India and Paki-
stan, which seems to bias the shape of slopes8. A tentative plan to drop these six 
observations generates the following results: 
Table 2. Trade coefficients after removing the suspected influential data from 
UNMOGIP 
The Trade coefficients in the linear regressions change considerably. For the 
Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% * 
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linear model with Ctb-num as dependent variable, the Trade coefficient becomes 
positive, significant at the 99% level and points to the theoretically-expected direc-
tion. It means that when controlling for other variables, with a ten million US dollar 
increase of the trade volume between China and host countries, Beijing sends ap-
proximately 30 more peacekeepers. The Trade coefficient in the other regression still 
does not have the predicted sign, but loses significance.  
The identification of influential data averts a premature conclusion, predicated on the 
statistical results in Table 1, that there might be signs of a negative relationship be-
tween trade volume and China’s participation. While the insignificant results from 
the logistic regressions possibly indicate that economic interests measured by trade 
volume is not likely to have influence on China’s willingness of participation, the 
significant coefficient obtained from the linear regression - when some influential 
data is removed - suggests that once China decides to participate in UNPKO, it is 
likely to send more peacekeepers to host countries where it maintains strong eco-
nomic relationships. 
Hypothesis 2 – Normative concerns and territorial interests 
There is some evidence from the regression analysis supporting this hypothesis. The 
Terricon variable is the proper sign (negative) but does not pass the significance test 
in both logistic regressions. This result can be interpreted as follows: the incompati-
bility of conflict concerning territory is not likely to affect whether or not China par-
ticipates in UNPKO. For the linear regression, the Terricon variable reveals some 
ambiguous results. With Cbt-num as dependent variable, the Terricon coefficient is -
43,933, significant at the 90% level. Pointing to a theoretically-expected direction, it 
implies that when controlling for other variables, China downsizes its peacekeeper 
contribution by around 44 persons if UNPKO operates in territorial conflict. Howev-
er, the linear regression taking Cbt-perc as dependent variable results in a Terricon 
coefficient significant at the 99 % level, pointing to the opposite direction. It is 0,012 
indicating that the percentage of Chinese peacekeepers in territorial conflict is 1.2% 
higher than that in non-territorial conflict when controlling for other variables. This 
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outcome suggests that while China reduces the number of Chinese peacekeepers 
in a territorial conflict, the percentages that it occupies actually increase9. 
A closer look at the data casts light on this seemingly contradictory result. For 
instance, from 2005 to 2009, the number of Chinese peacekeepers in the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC, a non-territorial conflict) ranged from 230 to 234 annually, represent-
ing only 1.27% to 1.64% of the total mission personnel, while during the same 
period, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO, a territorial conflict) receives only 13 to 21 Chinese peacekeepers, 
occupying a much larger percentage  – 5.7% to 9.1%. Moving from a non-
territorial conflict (MONUC) to a territorial one (MINURSO), the Ctb-num ob-
serves a huge decrease of China’s troop contribution, whereas the Ctb-perc 
marks an augmentation. Evidently, the size of the peacekeeping mission and the 
contribution that other countries make - while exerting no influence on the Ctb-
num variable - can greatly influence the value of Ctb-perc. Consequently, while 
both measurements gauge China’s contribution, their coding values of the same 
case can lead to completely different conclusions regarding the relationship be-
tween territorial conflicts and China’s contribution. However, it is reasonable to 
take both values into account, as the seemingly contradictory results may signify 
the necessity to put into perspective China’s concern over getting involved in 
peacekeeping in territorial disputes. While China sends less peacekeepers to 
territorial conflicts, other countries seem to also follow the same pattern - possi-
bly downsizing their contributions on an even larger scale than China, thus mak-
ing China’s contribution increase in terms of percentage. This interpretation is 
more understandable, when considering most of the current troop contributors 
are developing countries - which are generally supporters of the Westphalian 
interpretation of sovereignty and may find sending troops to intervene in other 
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Overall, it can be argued that, considering its troop contribution to territorial con-
flicts is significantly less, China is afraid that its decision to intervene in territorial 
conflicts may boomerang and compromise its own territorial interests. However, this 
concern is unlikely to fully encumber its latitude to act as to peacekeeping. Probably 
due to its increasing confidence that comes along with its growing national capabili-
ties, China is willing to put its concern on the back burner to pursue other more im-
portant goals.  
Hypothesis 3 – Responsible global power 
The problem of influential data makes the minimal supportive evidence found in 
Table 1 inconclusive and there is no proof in favor of this hypothesis after a tentative 
plan to remove the influential data. 
While the Bdeath coefficients all point in the expected direction, only one gains sig-
nificance. The statistical test using Parti as dependent variable does not produce a 
single significant Bdeath coefficient. This lack of significance has to be interpreted 
with caution due to the small sample size; however, such a result seems to indicate 
that the severity of a conflict measured by battle-related deaths exerts no impact on 
the probability of China’s participation in UNPKO. The Bdeath coefficient for the 
linear regression with Ctb-num as dependent variable is 0,293, significant at the 95% 
level, denoting that controlling for other variables, when there is an increase of 
10,000 battle-related deaths, China sends about three more peacekeepers. A look at 
the partial-regression plot and the scatter-plot of standardized DFbeta of this coeffi-
cient reveals that influential data may exist. Three observations could have over-
proportional effects on the Bdeath coefficient in this Ctb-num regression: the obser-
vation of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and 
two observations of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC). As shown in Table 3, it remains positive (0,111), but becomes insignifi-
cant when these three observations are dropped. 
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Table 3. Bdeath coefficients after removing the suspected influential data from 
UNTAC and UNIIMOG 
Meanwhile, Table 1 displays that when China’s participation is measured in percent-
age, there is no significant result. The influence of unusual data is again detected and 
the culprit appears to be one observation (Year 1992) of the UNTAC, which greatly 
magnifies the size of effect of Bdeath on Ctm-perc. Table 3 illustrates that the 
Bdeath coefficient in this regression becomes negative, but still insignificant when 
this observation is omitted. Overall, the statistical results relating to the Bdeath varia-
ble in the original sample are likely to be biased by influential data. A tentative solu-
tion to remove the unusual observations in both linear regressions does not generate 
any significant Bdeath coefficient. Hence, hypothesis 3 does not appear to garner 
empirical support.  
However, it is difficult to fully refute China’s claim of being a “responsible great 
power” only based on the lack of significance found here regarding the hypothesis 3. 
Previous research (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004 & 2008) shows that the 
UN tends to intervene in more “difficult” cases. Following this line of argument, as 
long as China does not veto a UNPKO, all the established UNPKOs can be consid-
Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% * 
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ered as a piece of evidence supporting China’s claim, because it is true by definition 
that any decision to initiate UNPKO entails China’ support with its P-5 membership. 
However, troop commitment is different from political commitment; and constitutes 
a more persuasive signal of being a responsible power. Hence, the non-significant 
result relating to hypothesis 3 may be more appropriately interpreted as follows: Bei-
jing may think that its claim of being a “responsible global power” has already been 
convincingly evidenced by its political commitment. When it comes to dispatching 
troops and getting involved on the ground level – a sign of deeper commitment to its 
claim, China - probably like other countries - becomes more cautious. A high level 
of battle-related deaths could be an indication that the peacekeeping on the field in-
volves a high degree of risk and complexity. The desire to be seen as a “responsible 
great power” alone does not guarantee China’s willingness to take risk and send 
troops to conflicts with high level of battle-related deaths.  
Hypothesis 4 – Security policy 
This hypothesis finds strong statistical evidence from the regression analysis. The 
Secupo variable is the only one that gains significance across all the regressions. The 
logistic regressions produce coefficients 3.83 and 2,632 from the original and adjust-
ed sample. Both are significant at the 99% level, implying that China’s willingness 
of participation has considerably augmented since 2005. The Securpo coefficient in 
the linear regression taking Ctb-num as dependent variable is 114,134, significant at 
the 99% level, suggesting that when controlling for other variables, a mission re-
ceives approximately 114 more Chinese peacekeepers in the post-2005 period than 
before. Similar results are obtained from the linear model measuring China’s contri-
bution as a function of the percentage of Chinese peacekeepers. The coefficient 
0,006 passes the significant test at the 95% level10. 
The consistent statistical finding related to the Secupo variable is the strongest result 
in this study and indicates that since the PLA’s operational orientation became no 
longer confined to internal security and evolved to be more externally-focused, Chi-
na is more disposed to participate in UNPKO and makes more substantial troop con-
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tributions. However, contrary to the causal direction proposed by hypothesis 4, it 
is also reasonable to argue that the dependent variable - China’s participation in 
UNPKO - could be part of the reason why China’s security policy becomes in-
creasingly externally-oriented in the first place. It is worth mentioning here Mul-
venon’s study (2009: 2), in which he asserts in a general manner that the change 
in the PLA’s security policy is compelled by “China’s increasingly global inter-
ests and entanglements.” However, it remains unspecified what the “global 
interests and entanglements” exactly refer to. In this case, the best remedy 
would be to conduct a more detailed process-tracing case study on the factors 
conducive to the transformation in the PLA’s operational orientation. If the 
transformation is mainly due to, for instance, China’s globalized economic inter-
ests then the causal effect of security policy on China’s participation in UNPKO 
can be better evidenced by the statistical finding. Hence, further research is ne-
cessitated in order to make fully conclusive statement. 
Control variable analysis – Geographical differences 
The control variables shed some extra light on the pattern of Chinese UN peace-
keeping, with some evidence of regional bias in favor of Africa. 
In the logistic regressions, the constant coefficients are significantly negative, 
indicating China is less likely to participate in missions to the Western Hemi-
sphere. In fact, China has only participated in the mission to Haiti out of eight 
missions in this region. However, the significant result may not be reliable due 
to the small sample size. The coefficients on the European and Former Soviet 
Union dummy (-0,016) and the Africa dummy (0,012) are also significant, when 
Ctb-perc is the dependent variable. The percentage of Chinese peacekeepers is 
significantly lower in missions to the European and Former Soviet Union coun-
tries. Until 2010, China has only participated in two missions to this region, 
sending 15 peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (UNMIBH) and 20 peacekeepers to the United Nations Interim Admin-
istration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). These contributions are very small, giv-
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en that UNMIBH usually consists of 2000 peacekeepers and UNMIK comprises 
150011. The results, however, need to be treated with caution, because the tolerance 
value of the Eusu variable does not pass the threshold of 2. This is possibly due to a 
bivariate correlation between the Eusu and Terricon variables, since the majority of 
cases coded as Eusu is also coded as territorial conflict. Therefore, no conclusive 
statement can be drawn. However, all these preliminary results may indicate that 
China exhibits more circumspection on its decision to dispatch troops if the target 
country is primarily in the lap of other major powers. The opposite trend is detected 
with respect to missions in Africa, in which China shows propensity for comprising a 
larger proportion of the UN troops. And if one does not apply a strict rule of thumb, 
the statistical result on the Africa coefficient appears to be reliable, with a tolerance 
value 0,20812. This finding confirms some researchers’ claim (Butts & Bankus, 
2009; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008; Wu & Talyor, 2011) that China accords 
particular attention to peacekeeping in Africa.  
An African sample 
On the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation, Chinese leaders promise that China 
would continue to take an active part in UNPKO to promote peace and conflict reso-
lution on the continent. Luck (cited in Lynch, 2006) goes further to suggest that Afri-
ca is a "bellwether" for Chinese attitudes on intervention. Therefore, China may ar-
guably have a more coherent, focused and proactive peacekeeping policy towards 
Africa; missions to Africa constitute a good sub-sample for gauging to what extent 
China’s policy on peacekeeping can be active and progressive13. Statistical results 
from the multivariate linear regressions against the African sample are displayed in 
Table 6. At large, the previous comments on the four hypotheses are still germane 
when it comes more specifically to China’s peacekeeping efforts in Africa. 
The results from this sub-sample corroborates that the problem of influential data 
arises as to the Trade variable in the original sample and that China is more likely to 
send more peacekeepers to African countries with which it has more substantial trade 
relationship. In this sub-sample, the Trade coefficients are significant in both regres-
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Table 4. Results of the African sample14 
Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% * 
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sions, which confirms, to certain degree, some researchers’ (Butts & Bankus, 2009; 
Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008; Wu & Talyor, 2011) mercantilist interpretation 
that China’s peacekeeping engagement in Africa is mainly driven by its economic 
interests.  
Secondly, when the sample is restricted to the African missions, conflicts that are 
more severe in terms of battle-related death do not appear to receive more or less 
Chinese peacekeepers, if anything, there is evidence indicating that the proportion of 
Chinese peacekeeper seems to be in decline in severe conflicts. This finding is gener-
ally in line with the previous statement pertaining to hypothesis 3 that Beijing acts 
prudently when it comes to troop contribution. Dispatching troops to more deadly 
conflicts does not seem to be the most cost-effective way for China to demonstrate 
their commitment to being a responsible power.  
Additionally, the most interesting statistical finding is concerned with the Terricon 
variable and reflects how proactive China can be as to peacekeeping. The coefficient 
is in the right sign (negative) when China’s contribution is measured in number, but 
does not pass the significance test for the first time in this study. However it remains 
positive and significant in the linear regression with Ctb-perc as dependent variable. 
The number of Chinese peacekeepers in African missions is not influenced by the 
incompatibility of conflict concerning territory; there is even evidence that the per-
centage of Chinese peacekeepers would increase if missions operated in territorial 
conflicts. Taking the significant results on the Trade variable into account, it may be 
claimed that regarding China’s decision-making on peacekeeping in Africa, econom-
ic rationale overrides China’s concern over its involvement in the conflict resolution 
of territorial dispute. This finding illuminates that under certain circumstances – for 
instance, in pursuit of economic interests – China may deviate from being an obsti-
nate defender of the traditional interpretation of sovereignty  
Lastly, the Secupo variable shows similar results to those in Table 4 and suggests 
that China’s emerging role in Africa should also be put into perspective. The statisti-
cal finding indicates that during the post-2005 period, the number of Chinese peace-
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keepers in missions to Africa has grown considerably; but the proportion of 
peacekeepers that China takes in these missions remains basically unchanged 
throughout the years. Since the size of UN missions in Africa appears to have 
expanded in recent years, the increasing number of Chinese peacekeepers that 
African countries host during the post-2005 period does not necessarily imply 
that the growth of China’s troop contribution on the continent is out of propor-
tion. Quite the contrary, the share of Chinese peacekeepers in missions to Africa 
has remained stable. By and large, the rising distribution of Chinese peacekeep-
ers to Africa follows the broader pattern in which the UN sends the bulk of its 
personnel. that is to say, as the UN accords increasing importance to the conflict 
resolution efforts in Africa and enlarges the size of missions, troop contributors 
including China thereupon boost their troop contribution. Hence, China proba-
bly does not act more responsibly than other countries; but it does not drag be-
hind either. Regarding the Status and Interme variables, they gain significance 
when China’s contribution is measured in percentage. However, the limited 
number of observations for these two variables precludes the possibility of 
drawing substantial inference15. 
Conclusion 
While increasing its troop contribution, China remains selective in terms of 
which missions it sends peacekeepers. Previous research indicates that China’s 
economic, territorial, reputational and security policy interests could exert influ-
ence on China’s decision to send troops. This study draws hypotheses from 
these theoretical arguments and runs a mix of OLS and logistics regressions 
against samples composed of UNPKOs (1989-2010) to explore China’s motiva-
tion for participation in UN peacekeeping.  
      The strongest result is that the shift in China’s security policy towards the 
externally-oriented end has a significant and positive impact on China’s willing-
ness to participate in missions and contribute troops. There is also some evi-
dence indicating that host countries which maintain higher trade volumes with 
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China tend to receive a larger number of Chinese peacekeepers. China’s territorial 
interest and normative concern over intervention are found to reduce its contribution, 
with Chinese peacekeepers featuring significantly less in territorial conflicts. Howev-
er, other troop contributors probably share the same kind of concern. Finally, the 
answer to the question of whether participating in UNPKO shows that China is a 
responsible power may not be as simple as it appears to be. It depends on whether 
one talks about China’s political or troop commitment to UNPKO; and it also de-
pends on how much troop contribution that the international community expects 
from China. Regarding the troop commitment, China is no more likely to display 
stronger willingness to participate or contribute more peacekeepers in deadly con-
flict. However, there is also evidence indicating that the surge of Chinese peacekeep-
ers in recent years by and large follows the expansion in the size of UNPKO. The 
exponential growth both in the number and size of peacekeeping missions places the 
UN under huge stress. Hence the increasing number of Chinese peacekeepers on the 
ground could also be seen as a sign of China’s commitment to being a responsible 
player.  
China’s peacekeeping behavior constitutes a micro-cosmos to observe the increasing 
complexity of China’s diplomatic and policy maneuvers in its path from being a 
third-world developing country to a major power. The finding in this thesis generally 
shows that as to peacekeeping participation, China is primarily a self-interested, ra-
tional actor who is undertaking a deliberate cost-benefit analysis and strives to strike 
a delicate balance between competing interests – each of which potentially requires 
different policy responses. Rather than being static, China’s interpretation on sover-
eignty is also maneuverable. Its flexibility on sovereignty and intervention is primar-
ily bound by the security situation in China’s border areas and whether other national 
imperatives come into play, such as pursuing economic development. This is mark-
edly illustrated by China’s peacekeeping policy in Africa, as economic rational tends 
to outweigh China’s normative concern and territorial interests. Hence, in practice, 
rather than being bridled by some rigid principles, China’s decision on peacekeeping 
is primarily made on a case-by-case basis. Based on the result from this study, it can 
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also be predicted that as long as China’s security policy remains (or becomes 
more) externally-oriented - which implies that there is no major internal security 
threat, for instance, in its border areas - and China’s economic interdependency 
with the world continues to deepen, China’s contribution of peacekeepers is 
likely to be remain stable and probably rise in the foreseeable future. In general, 
this is a piece of good news that the shorthanded UN and DPKO are delighted to 
hear, whilst possibly making no substantial difference to host countries that are 
not on the African continent and/or without substantial economic relationship 
with China. Over a longer period of time, it remains to be seen whether China 
will follow other western powers’ path to shift its troop contribution to “hybrid” 
or non-UN peace operations. 
 
Endnotes 
1. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is used to predict values of a contin-
uous dependent  variable using one or more explanatory variables and 
gauge the strength of the relationship between these variables. Logistic 
regression in general is used to predict a dichotomous/binary outcome. 
2. In some UNPKOs, China participated in a later stage rather than from the 
very beginning of a mission. In order to capture such a dynamic, this arti-
cle follows Lawson’s research design (2011: 27). He considers those UN-
PKOs to which China did not send its peacekeepers until at least one 
year after the beginning of the operation as separate cases (UNIBH, MO-
NUC, UNFIL, UNMIK). For instance, the UNMIK in Kosovo operated 
from 1999 till present. But China did not send its peacekeepers to Koso-
vo until 2004 and withdrew its participation again in 2009. Therefore, the 
1999-2003 and 2009-2010 periods are both coded as “0” because of Chi-
na’s non-participation, while the 2004-2008 period is coded as “1”. In 
order to avoid statistical biases that are likely to be provoked by this dou-
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ble or triple counting of a UNPKO, the logistic regression is run against a 
sample that does not treat the above-mentioned missions as separate cases. 
3. Data related to all these three independent variables are collected from the Archive 
of Troop and Police Contributors. 
4. All the monetary values are converted to constant US dollars (in 2003 dollars). 
Data on bilateral trade is primarily collected from the China Statistical Year-
book (1986-2011). For a very limited number of cases, data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Direction of Trades statistics database is also 
used. 
5. I also tried to convert this variable into a 0-100 scale; however, the statistical re-
sults remained unchanged. 
6. As a rule of thumb, when the tolerance value is smaller than 0.2/0.3, one should be 
concerned with multi co-linearity. multi co-linearity does not appear to exist 
in all the regressions with respect to all the independent variables. 
7. This study mainly relies on the partial regression plot and scatterplot of standard-
ized DFbeta to detect influential data. A partial regression plot shows the 
marginal role of a variable in the model, given that all the other independent 
variables are already in the model. Dfbeta is a t-test for the difference of the b
-coefficient with and without a certain observation. 
8. The trade volume of these observations (2005-2010) stands outside around three 
standard deviations (51,8) from the mean value (12,2) of the Trade variable. 
9. According to the partial regression plot and scatterplot of standardized DFbeta of 
the coefficient Terricon in both linear regressions, the problem of influential 
data appears to be minor. 
10. According to the partial regression plot and scatterplot of standardized DFbeta of 
the coefficient Secupo in both linear regressions, the problem of influential 
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data appears to be minor. 
11. In 2011, another mission to Europe, UNFICYP (Cyprus), received, for the 
first time, 2 Chinese peacekeepers. However, this data is located outside 
the time-frame of this thesis. 
12. A less strict rule of thumb: one does not need to be concerned when the tol-
erance value is bigger than 2. 
13. This sub-sample is only used to run the linear regressions because the sam-
ple size for the logistic regressions is too limited to establish a sub-
sample. 
14. As previously discussed, the problm of influential data often generates non-
significant results or significant results in signs that are contrary to 
theoretical expectations in this study. In fact, influential data may hint at 
the necessity of model re-specification (Fox: 2012). Influential data from 
UNMOGIP shows that international-level factors, such as the power sta-
tus of the target state, are helpful in construing China’s troop contribu-
tion. It is highly improbable that the gigantic bilateral trade would impel 
China to send peacekeepers to India, because India is a major regional - 
increasingly global - power. Meanwhile, some observations from 
UNTAC are considered as influential data. A preliminary study of the 
peace process in Cambodia shows that China is probably more likely to 
commit troops to solve conflict if it has previously intervened as 
intermediary. Therefore, two new variables Power Status (Status) and 
Intermediary Intervention (Interme) are included to run robustness 
checks. The results of robustness checks show that the previous state-
ments pertaining to the four hypotheses still hold. These two variables are 
also included in regression analysis against the African sample. 
15. Based on the list of major power coded by Mullenbach (2005: 542) to scruti-
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nize the effect of the power status of target state on the establishment of third-
party peacekeeping mission, only three observations can be coded as involv-
ing major power in the sample of this study. These are respectively, UNMEE, 
UNMOGIP and UNIIMOG. Meanwhile, Cambodia and Sudan appear to be 
the only two cases in which China played a role as intermediary. 
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